10th URPh Annual Seminar 2016 - Imagination as an Act: Phenomenological Approaches
дата: 25-29 април 2016
място: University of Liège (Белгия)
For its 10th edition,
the Research Seminar will focus on the topic of imagination taken as a mental
function which is different from both perception and conception.
Kant notoriously made
of imagination some (rather floating) intermediary between the receptivity of
sense experience and the spontaneity of understanding. By staying on the ground
of descriptive psychology and by using the terms of "mental acts" or
"mental functions" rather than of "faculties", Brentanians
were able to analyse the elements/components of the act of imagination
(intentional mode, real content, intentional content...), its founding
relations with other kinds of acts, as well as the role it can play in the
cognitive and evaluative functions of the mind.
Like sense perception,
imagination involves hyletic components, which, as Husserl claims, puts it
amongst acts of intuition and allows it to fulfill meaning intentions. However,
unlike sensations, images do not present themselves on the mode of actuality, which
means that they can only play part of the role of fulfillment: like sensations
they provide concrete instances of what was thought in a general way, yet
unlike sensations they do not confirm the effective reality of what was just
conceived. They result either in a de-realising attitude towards the presented
objects (which are explicitly taken as unreal) or in a suspensive attitude
towards the ontological status of the presented objects (which are considered
without concern for the question of their existence). Such a freedom from the
question of actuality is also what allows imagination to consider unrealised
possibilities. Now, to imagine possibilities is not the same as to conceive
them. First of all, imagination considers singular and concrete possibilities
while conceptual thought only considers general possibilities - it is not the
same to think about "golden mountain" and to imagine one. Secondly,
while considering possibilities, imagination seems to be restricted by some
specific constraints: not all what is theoretically conceivable can be
presented in space and time and therefore can be imagined - a "surface
without colour", a "triangle which is neither scalene nor isosceles
nor right-angled" or a "round square" can be conceived yet not
imagined.
From such descriptive
features of imagination result some essential epistemic, esthetic, moral and
political functions.
By meeting their
limits, imaginary variations help to identify material essences. The
illustrative but also exploratory role of the construction of figures and
diagrams supporting mathematical proofs confirms the importance of intuition in
what first seemed to be a pure matter of understanding. And such intuition is
not so much perceptive as imaginative, since figures are not given for their
effective singularity but as standing for a lot of similar figures whose
features can vary within some limits.
Imagination also
provides concrete representations that help to "materialize"
ideologies and facilitate their affective investment by connecting them with
sensibility. This explains both the didactic efficiency of pictures and the
fact that they can be instrumentalized. On another side, imagination allows to
consider alternatives to the actual situation. By suspending the actual
determinations and by unlocking ideologically shaped situations imagination
works on many grounds as a critical tool: struggle against assigned identities,
deconstruction of normative evidence, reconfiguration of common/shared
territories, play with kinds and roles, and so on. The work of opening
possibilities and promoting indecision which imagination often practices by
using artistic tools (either literary or visual) allows new determinations.
In so far as it
inhabits within the tension between concepts and sensibility, imagination is
the function on which creativity stands. It allows the reconfiguration of the
relations between sensibility and understanding, which are both mobilized by
artistic creation. Through imagination, art throws us into some free play of
the faculties since - as Romantics will say after Kant - it leads to two
suspensions : suspension of the cognitive power of understanding (which
determines sensibility according to categories) and, through de-realisation,
suspension of the interested nature of sensibility.
The seminar aims at
investigating such descriptive features and functions of imagination which
separate it from both perception and conception. It will particularly be
relevant to:
- finely analyze the act of imagination
(and its elements/components) on the ground of descriptive psychology, by
contrasting it with perception, meaning intention, as well as with other
mental functions such as memory;
- study the specific role of the
act of imagination (by contrast with sense experience and intellectual
conception) within knowledge, but also within political and/or artistic
representation and creativity
Invited speakers:
·
Margherita Arcangeli (Université de Genève)
·
Roland Breeur (Husserl Archives, KULeuven)
·
Chiara Cappelletto (Università degli Studi di Milano)
·
Annabelle Dufourcq (Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen)
·
Augustin Dumont (Université de Montréal)
·
Kathleen Lennon (University of Hull, UK)
·
Alain Loute (Université Catholique de Lille)
·
Delia Popa (Université Catholique de Louvain)
·
David Rabouin (REHSEIS, CNRS)
Call-for-papers:
Proposals (title and
abstract, maximum 700 words) are invited from senior researchers as well as
graduate students, and must be sent to B. Leclercq (b.Leclercq[at]ulg.ac.be)
by January 5, 2016. Please use only the electronic submission form
(doc.txt)
The abstracts will be
evaluated by the URPh board through a blind-review process. Acceptance or
refusal will be notified by January 15.
Practical details:
Registration is not
required for attendance. At the participant's request, the Philosophy
Department will issue a certificate which can be used for doctoral
certification (ECTS).
The talks will be in
English and French. Passive understanding of French is recommended.
The Doctoral School
does not cover the accommodation and travel costs of the CFP speakers.
Information on accommodation is available.
Organizing committee:
Maud Hagelstein
Alievtina Hervy
Bruno Leclercq
Raphael Gely
Contact
maud.hagelstein@ulg.ac.be
– ahervy@ulg.ac.be - b.leclercq@ulg.ac.be
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